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Austro-German Liberalism
and the Modern Liberal Tradition

Harry Ritter
Western Washington University
Der Liberalismus ist aus, eine neue Zeit bricht an, Platz fur
uns!
Hermann Bahr, 1882
Die Welt will heute vom Liberalismus nichts mehr wissen.
Ausserhalb Englands ist die Bezeichnung 'Liberalismus'
geradezu geachtet.
Ludwig von Mises, 1927
Modes of historical interpretation

change . . . the past grows

with the present. Historians view past and present in some sort
of simultaneous vision. Some of them believe that an informed
picture of the past may shed some light on the unfolding future
- or at least they know that a mythical past ill instructs the
present.
Fritz Stern, The Failure of Illiberalism
In a widely-cited essay on turn-of-the century Vienna, Carl
Schorske alludes to the"dissolution of the classical liberal view of
man in the crucible of Austria's modern politics

....

[and] the

emergence of psychological man from the wreckage of the old
culture."' The theme of liberal decline has provided Schorske with
the backdrop for several important articles on late nineteenthcentury Austria, and a number of interesting monographs on
1. Carl E. Schorske, "Politics and the Psyche in fin de siecle Vienna: Schnitzler
and Hofmannsthal," The American Historical Review, 66 (July 1961):946.
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related topics have also recently appeared.2 Relatively few
historical studies, however, address the subject of Austrian
liberalism per se,3 and those which do are mostly broad surveys.4
2. Schorske's essays are collected in Fin-de-Siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture
(New York, 1980). Related works include William J. McGrath, Dionysian Art and
Populist Politics in Austria (New Haven, Conn., 1974);Andrew G. Whiteside, The
Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schonerer and Austrian Pan-Germanism
(Berkeley, 1975);and John W. Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna:
Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848-1897(Chicago, 1981).
3. Even native Austrian historians have paid scant attention to the subject for
its own sake. This is partially explained by the fact that, from the late nineteenth
century to the 1950s,the philosophical faculties of Austrian universities were often
hostile to liberalism, and the leading early historians of the movement - e.g.,
Friedjung, Kolmer, Charmatz - worked primarily as journalists and freelance
authors. The fact that Richard Charmatz, once called by Fritz Fellner the "real
historian of Austrian liberalism" ("Richard Charmatz: Biograph Osterreichs,"
Forum [March 1965]:113-114),is usually either forgotten completely or dismissed as a
mere "publicist" is just one measure of the extent to which the subject has been
deemed insignificant. To be sure, histories of nineteenth-century Austria
customarily concede that certain ministers (Bruck, Koerber, Bohm-Bawerk, etc.)
were strongly influenced by liberal ideas, that rentiers and the banking,
commercial, and manufacturing community were sympathetic to liberalism, and
that the press - above all, the Neue Freie Presse and the Neues Wiener Tagblatt was a liberal influence. But, having mentioned this in passing, Austrian historians
normally proceed to what they regard as the genuinely important topics:
nationalism, socialism, constitutional reform, the role of the Jews, etc.
works: Richard Charmatz, Deutsch4. Among the indispensable
Osterreichische Politik: Studien uber den Liberalismus und iiber die auswirtige
Politik Osterreichs (Leipzig, 1907),by an early twentieth century proponent of "neoliberal" regeneration who laid bare the flaws of the "old liberalism" in classic
fashion - still the "best account of the development of the 'liberal' party groupings
and factions of the Reichsrat" (Karl Vocelka, Verfassung oder Konkordat? Der
publizistische und politische Kampf der 6sterreichischen Liberalen um die
Religionsgesetze des Jahres 1868[Vienna, 1978],p. 16);Georg Franz, Liberalismus:
die deutschliberale Bewegung in der habsburgischen Monarchie (Munich, 1955),
sympathetic to the liberals, but vitiated by the tone of self-pity and "tragedy"
characteristic of national liberalism in the tradition of classic liberal historiography
a la Friedjung, as well as antipathy to the alleged atomistic individualism of western
Europe; Karl Eder, Der Liberalismus in Altbsterreich: Geisteshaltung, Politik,
Kultur (Vienna, 1955), written by a priest, unsympathetic to liberalism; Albert
Fuchs, Geistige Strbmungen in Osterreich 1867-1918(Vienna, 1949),written with
engaging naivete and humanity, though Fuchs was a Marxist with a compulsion to
interpret absolutely everything in simplistic terms of class-bound ideology; Eduard
Winter, Romantismus, Restauration, und Friihliberalismus im osterreichischen
Vormdrz (Vienna, 1968)and Revolution, Neoabsolutismus und Liberalismus in der
Donaumonarchie (Vienna, 1969), couched in the mock epic tone of an "ordeal" of
liberal Catholicism in the Vormarz, with the philosopher Bolzano as martyr. Like
the surveys of Franz, Eder, and Fuchs, Winter's books are primarily studies in
traditional Geistesgeschichte. Diethild Harrington-Miiller, Der Fortschrittsklub im
Abgeordnetenhaus des osterreichischen Reichsrat 1873-1910(Vienna, 1972),surveys
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Aside from these general studies, our detailed knowledge of the
subject -

such as it is -

rests on scattered articles, chapters or

segments of chapters in general histories and monographs, and a
handful of Austrian disserations.5
In this essay I propose to broadly evaluate the existing
literature on Austrian liberalism, and to advocate, as well, some
new directions for research; in the process I will frequently address
the question of current scholarship on liberalism in general, and
occasionally touch on the situation with regard to regions other
than Austria, particularly Germany and Britain. My remarks will
deal more with ways historians have thought about liberalism and
might think about liberalism than with liberalism itself. It is no
doubt preferable, as someone has said, to supply one concrete
answer than a host of proposals for further research; the fact
remains that the important subject of Austro-German liberalism
has hitherto been on the periphery of historians' research agenda.
In this case, a reconsideration of conventional generalizations
would seem to repay the effort.
It is not difficult to see why the subject of liberalism in Austria
has been neglected. It is a fact, after all, that proponents of
liberalism in Austria never succeeded in defining their aims in a

the history of the liberal party coalitions in the Cisleithanian parliament. The
scholarly and popular essays of Adam Wandruszka must also be noted, especially
"Osterreichs politische Struktur," in Heinrich Benedikt, ed., Geschichte der
Republik Osterreich (Vienna, 1954). Wandruszka has been very important for
establishing a widely-accepted sense of liberalism's place in the sweep of modern
Austrian political history. His conception of a dialectical conflict between liberalism
and its "post-liberal" antitheses - nationalism, socialism, and Christian socialism has been so thoroughly assimilated over the past twenty-five years that his work is
often no longer specifically cited. His essay on "Osterreichs politische Struktur" is an
impressive synthesis - possibly the key source in the contemporary network of
literature about modern Austrian politics - but too many historians have accepted
it uncritically as the final word on liberalism.
5. It should be said that a number of recent monographs which focus on
subjects other than liberalism contain much valuable information on liberalism
itself - e.g., Heinrich Lutz, Osterreich-Ungarn und die Griindung des deutschen
Reiches. Europdische Entscheidungen 1867-1871 (Frankfurt, 1978), and HarmHinrich Brandt, Der Osterreichische Neoabsolutismus. Staatsfinanzen und Politik
1848-1860,2 vols. (G6ttingen, 1978).This scattered information needs to be gathered
and synthesized. One should also note the appearance of two important articles on
the conceptual history of liberalism in Rudolf Vierhaus, "Liberalismus" and Rudolf
Walther, "Exkurs: Wirtschaftlicher Liberalismus," in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze,
and Reinhart Koselleck, eds., Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon
zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart, 1982), vol. 3: pp. 741-785,
787-815.
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way which appealed to the broad public,6 and that organized
liberalism enjoyed only a fleeting taste of parliamentary leadership

- based on a severely limited franchise - in the 1860s and 1870s. On

these grounds alone, it is perhaps not surprising that Austrian
liberalism should often be overlooked, or dismissed as a historical
curio and political dead end. Moreover, for obvious reasons the
focus of attention in central European studies in recent years has
been on National Socialism and its origins in late nineteenthcentury radicalism and "cultural pessimism"; there has been little
incentive for either senior or apprentice historians to study a
movement such as liberalism, whose values are widely alleged to
have been overwhelmed and transcended in the early twentieth
century. John W. Boyer's new study of Viennese Christian
Socialism, cited above, deals extensively with liberalism and
constitutes in some respects an important advance over previous
literature, insofar as it takes seriously some of liberalism's positive
achievements. Still, even here liberalism is not given center stage,
but functions as a foil for "radicalism."
In German history the situation is now improving (see note 17),
although until quite recently interest in liberalism was chiefly
peripheral, largely confined to charting the reasons for the
doctrine's inability to arrest aggressive nationalism, imperialism,
political irrationalism, and totalitarianism.7 Indeed, the entire
6. Franz, Liberalismus, p. 239, speaks of the liberals' "theoretical confusion"
and striking "lack of political effectiveness." A standard reason given for neglecting
the subject is that organized political liberalism never progressed beyond the level of
an individualistic Honoratiorenpartei to produce a disciplined "mass party" (e.g.,
Vocelka, Verfassung oder Konkordat?, p. 94). If one's focus is primarily on the
evolution and success of political parties, it is likely that the nineteenth-century
liberal movement - identified with the Verfassungspartei and its fragmented
successors - will be interesting, at best, only as a precursor of subsequent
developments. Here again, Wandruszka's work has been crucial in establishing the
broad frame of reference, even for those not narrowly concerned with party or
political history such as Schorske.
7. See, e.g., most of the essays in Karl Holl and Gunter List, eds., Liberalismus
und imperialistischer

Staat: Der Imperialismus

als Problem liberaler Parteien in

Deutschland 1890-1914(Gottingen, 1975).An exception is Hans-Gunter Zmarzlik's
"Das Kaiserreich als Einbahstrasse?" pp. 62-71.Not infrequently liberalism is itself
made to bear a heavy burden of guilt for the rise of twentieth-century tyranny - and
it is not the Marxists alone who tar liberalism with the brush of embryonic
"fascism." For an interpretation strongly influenced by East German scholarship
see Walter Struve,

Elites Against

Democracy:

Leadership

Ideals in Bourgeois

Political Thought in Germany, 1890-1933(Princeton, 1973);a recent non-Marxist
example

is James J. Sheehan,

German

Liberalism

in the Nineteenth

Century

(Chicago, 1978), pp. 273, 276-278, 281-282. There is wide agreement on German
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intellectual climate in recent decades has been fundamentally
unfavorable to the study of liberalism - whether it be the Austrian
species, the American, or any other variety - simply because the
notion that liberalism "died" on the eve of World War I and the idea
that its values are "bankrupt" today have become so remarkably
widespread and uncritically accepted. In many quarters, liberalism
is now automatically handled with heavy irony as yet another idea
whose time has come and gone, one whose nineteenth-century
disciples were either cynical, self-serving hypocrites or, at best,
confused captives of their own pathetic illusions.8
And yet, when we shift our eyes away from the printed page,
the contemporary political and economic scene in western Europe
and North America testifies at least as much to the liberal
tradition's vigor as to its decline. Even in the greater part of central
order flourishes
Europe, a neo-liberal
today (partially
the name of "social democracy").
to
be
under
sure,
masquerading,
We must certainly recognize that the establishment of the present
order was indirectly facilitated by Hitler, who destroyed powerful,
traditional obstacles to liberalism; that it was introduced under the
eye of western occupation; and that it was rendered especially
attractive to the native population by the shadow of Soviet tyranny.
Still, the fact that it not only exists, but apparently flourishes and
expands, suggests that it is not merely the product of coercion or
expediency, and that native traditions may somehow be involved. I
would like to suggest - while recognizing that theories of liberal as
well as illiberal Kontiniutdtslinien in central European history run
liberalism's "failure." Sheehan, for example, cites "liberalism's larger failure to
shape German politics and society" (p. 177), while Ralf Dahrendorf's widely
criticized but nonetheless influential Society and Democracy in Germany (New
York, 1967)is about "Germany's persistent failure to give a home to democracy in its
liberal sense" (p. 14).
8. Christopher Lasch's cavalier approach in The Culture of Narcissism:
American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York, 1978),p. xii, is
fairly typical: "Liberalism, the political theory of the ascendant bourgeoisie, long ago
lost the capacity to explain events in the world of the welfare state and the
multinational corporation; nothing has taken its place. Politically bankrupt,
liberalism is intellectually bankrupt as well." Lasch makes the common but
erroneous assumption that liberalism should be narrowly equated with laissez-faire
capitalism. It would not be difficult to compile a long list of quotations written in the
same sardonic vein; for a sampling of earlier opinion see Max Savelle, "Is Liberalism
Dead?" in the author's Is Liberalism Dead? and Other Essays (Seattle, 1967),pp. 3-22.
On the identification of the term "liberalism" with free enterprise economics, a
surprisingly recent practice which dates only from the turn of the twentieth
century, see Walther, "Exkurs: Wirtschaftlicher Liberalismus," pp. 787, 808-811.
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the risk of being equally one-sided, anachronistic, and misleading9
- that the subject of German liberalism in nineteenth-century
Austria deserves more sympathetic attention than it has hitherto
received.
The logical place to begin is with a survey of the broad contours
of the historiographical field as it stands today. At the most basic
level, conventional wisdom casts the history of Austrian liberalism
as a tale of failure. Liberalism was "the one political force ... that
perpetually lost."10 This general story is typically emplotted
(deliberately or not) in a number of ways, individually or in various
combinations:1 more or less sympathetically, as nostalgic elegy,
poignant melodrama, or melancholy pseudo-tragedy; with
olympian (often Hegelian) detachment, as a result of a
transcendental, inexorable process of change and dissolution; or
self-righteously and satirically - often with a touch of
Schadenfreude - as a grotesque comedy or farce of "internal
contradictions," dialectical oppositions, and paradoxes.
These remarks generally apply to the emplotment of central
European liberalism as a whole. Several decades ago, when the
ideals of classical liberalism were taken seriously and the
individual will was still given generous credit as a force in human
affairs, bourgeois tragedy - often coupled with the theme of
"missed opportunities" - was a popular plot form. In this
literature, a combination of factors - dynastic tradition,
ecclesiastical obscurantism, aristocratic Engherzigkeit, the
mistakes and flaws of the liberal leaders - led to liberalism's
"tragic" failure. The message concerning the "fate" of liberalism
was typically conveyed through the story of the martyrdom of a few
far-sighted but isolated heroes - in Austria's case, figures such as
Admiral Tegetthoff, Adolf Fischhof, to a certain degree Schmerling
9. Richard J. Evans, "Liberalism and Society: The Feminist Movement and
Social Change,"

in Richard

J. Evans, ed., Society

and Politics in Wilhelmine

Germany (New York, 1978),p. 204.
10. Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair (Garden City, N.Y., 1965), p. 2.

Stern is speaking here of northern Germany, but his comment applies, with
qualifications, to the historiography of Austrian liberalism as well. The story of
liberalism is usually emplotted in much the same way as the larger history of the
Danubian monarchy itself. Ideas of what was possible for nineteenth-century
Austrian liberalism are colored by conventional ideas about what was possible for
the old empire. If we believe that the empire was "destined" to collapse, this is likely
to affect our approach to liberalism and its "fate."
11. On the idea of historiographical "emplotment," see Hayden White,
Metahistory:

The

Historical

Imagination

in

Nineteenth-Century

(Baltimore, 1973).
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and, above all, Freiherr von Bruck.12More recently, the influence
of political sociology and social psychology has produced
interpretations which put less stress on individual choices or
character flaws, and lay more emphasis on impersonal, long-term
environmental and sociopsychological barriers to the success of
liberalism. This results in predominantly satiric emplotments of
the story of central Europe's "long road to modernity" in which
there are few heroes or martyrs. In the context of the "hard
realities of German life,"'3 liberalism in central Europe is
presented as a political fantasy which had no chance for success and
little practical relationship to the world in which it worked. Here
the mood is best described as one of ironic satire, only occasionally
relieved by a note of mild pity.
Whatever the overall plot form, convention usually demands
that the Austrian story be divided (explicitly or tacitly) into a three1) "early" liberalism
stage scheme of periodization:
naive,
(Friihliberalismus)
youthful,
strongly conditioned by the
humanitarian ideas of the Aufklarung and Josephinism - which
dissolves overnight in the sobering revolutionary upheavals of 1848.
(Three specific varieties of early liberalism are normally identified,
each with different socioeconomic roots: Hofratsliberalismus,
and biirgerlichstdndisch-aristokratischer
Liberalismus,
demokratischer
Liberalismus.)14
2) "High" liberalism
- prosaic, materialistic,
(Hochliberalismus)
hypocritical,
frightened of democracy and insensitive to social reform - which
collapses on the federal level in 1879,with the advent of Taaffe, and
on the municipal level in the 1890s,with the electoral triumphs of
Christian Socialism. (A subordinate theme here concerns the
continuing strain of bureaucratic liberalism, or Hofratsliberalismus, an extension of the eighteenth-century notion of the
Polizeistaat based on law, though this is often distinguished from
liberalism proper under the rubric "Josephinism.") 3) "Late" or
"post" liberalism (Spitliberalismus) - politically sterile and
senescent, though characterized by the seductive sheen of a third
generation cultural afterglow. Following this illusory Indian
summer of Kulturliberalismus, liberalism "dies" sometime before
1914, largely unnoticed and unmourned.
12. See, for example, Heinrich Friedjung's Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft
1897), as well as his Osterreich von 1848 bis
in Deutschland, 2 vols. (Stuttgart/Berlin,
1860, 2 vols. (Stuttgart/Berlin, 1908-1912);also, Richard Charmatz, Adolf Fischhof
(Stuttgart/Berlin, 1910) and Minister Freiherr von Bruck (Leipzig, 1916).
13. Sheehan, German Liberalism, p. 187.
14. Vocelka, Verfassung oder Konkordat?, p. 15.
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This interpretive paradigm rests, in turn, on broad theoretical
underpinnings provided by a few key studies: e.g., Adam
Wandruszka's classic analysis of modern Austria's "political
structure," according to which liberalism was aufgehoben in
dialectical conflict with its own offspring - Pan-Germanism,
Socialism, and Christian Socialism - and Hans Rosenberg's
analysis of central Europe's late nineteenth-century "great
depression," which undermined the materialistic ethos of the
Griinderzeit and its wagendes Biirgertum.'5 It is reinforced, as
well, by generations of serious and popular literary history,
aesthetic criticism, and Kulturgeschichte which concentrate on
Vienna's "froliche Apokalypse" and the literature of "fin-desiecle" alienation as the most significant cultural legacy of the late
Austrian empire.
This is obviously a simplified overview but not, I think, an
unfair or inaccurate one. I do not suggest that previous orientations
are completely false; what we have at present is a very full catalog
of the weaknesses and deficiencies of nineteenth-century
liberalism, and they were indeed manifold. I do maintain, however,
that questionable assumptions and serious gaps in this scholarly
tradition cause it to tilt much too far in one direction.
For one thing, the broad question of Austrian liberalism's place
in the history of modern liberalism as a whole merits closer
attention and reconsideration. The comparative history of
nineteenth and twentieth-century liberalism - if we except a few
older intellectual histories such as that of Ruggiero - is not far
advanced, for reasons which have already been outlined. The full
history of how, precisely, Austrian liberalism resembled or differed
from movements in Britain, France, the United States, etc., is an
ambitious future project which must await further monographic
research in the various regional fields. The recent flurry of interest
among scholars of Britain in turn-of-the-century British neoliberalism provides an important example of the possibilities which
can open up in an area of study which has long been considered

exhausted.'6

15. On Wandruszka, see footnote 4; Hans Rosenberg, "Political and Social
Consequences of the Great Depression of 1873-1896in Central Europe," The
Economic History Review, 13 (1943):58-73; Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit:
Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa (Berlin, 1967).
16. E.g., Michael Freeden, The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Reform
(Oxford, 1978);Peter Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism (Cambridge, 1971)
and Liberals and Social Democrats (Cambridge, 1978).For further bibliography on
recent scholarship regarding British neo-liberalism, see Geoff Eley, "James
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More to the immediate point is the matter of the comparative
history of Austrian and north German liberalism.17 For
understandable reasons, Gesamtdeutsch historiography has been
out of fashion since 1945; this has meant, unfortunately, that
developments in Germany have usually been treated in
unwarranted isolation from those of Austria-Hungary. This seems
curious in light of the fact that virtually every leading student of
modern central Europe pays lip service to the importance of an
appreciation of regional variation in understanding the area's
history. Were this view taken completely seriously, it would seem
as important to integrate the stories of the Viennese, Lower and
Upper Austrian, and Bohemian varieties of German liberalism into
the general picture, as it would to include those of Baden, Saxony,
Bavaria, etc. When the problem is approached from a central
Sheehan and the German Liberals: A Critical Appreciation," Central European
History 14 (September 1981):273-288,n. 7.
17. Perhaps the recent anthology edited by Robert A. Kann and Friedrich E.
Prinz, Deutschland und Osterreich: Ein bilaterales Geschichtsbuch (Vienna, 1980),
will encourage further interest in a comparative approach to the history of Germany
and Austria. In his article "What is German History? Reflections on the Role of the
Nation in German History and Historiography," The Journal of Modern History, 53
(1981): 1-24, Sheehan has also called for a broader, comparative perspective in
historical studies of modern German Europe. During the 1970s there was a
significant revival of interest in liberalism in Wilhelmine Germany, mainly with
respect to its relationship to social conservatism, imperialism, and the notion of a
German Sonderweg, or "special course," to modernity. See the very useful
Bibliographie zum deutschen Liberalismus (Gottingen, 1981), edited with an
interesting forward by Jiirgen C. Hess and E. van Steensel van der Aa. More
specifically, in addition to Sheehan's study of German Liberalism and the essays
edited by Holl and List, cited above, see Thomas Nipperdey, "Wehlers 'Kaiserreich.'
Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung," Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 1(1975):539-560;
Hans-Ginter Zmarzlik, "Das Kaiserreich in neuer Sicht?" Historische Zeitschrift,
222 (1976): 105-126;Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Der deutsche Liberalismus zwischen
'klassenloser Btirgergesellschaft' und 'Organisertem Kapitalismus'. Zu einigen
neueren Liberalismusinterpretationen," Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 4 (1978):7790; and Lothar Gall, "Der deutsche Liberalismus zwischen Revolution und
Reischsgrtindung," Historische Zeitschrift, 228 (1979): 98-108. Also relevant are
Eley's very perceptive "James Sheehan and the German Liberals, "cited above, and
the review article by Konrad H. Jarausch, "Illiberalism and Beyond: German
History in Search of a Paradigm," The Journal of Modern History, 55 (June 1983):
268-284.A central issue in much of this literature, dominated by a spirit of political
sociology inspired by Marx and Weber and keyed to modernization theory and Walt
Rostow's "take-off" thesis, is whether to situate the beginning of liberalism's "crisis"
in the 1850sor the 1880s.John W. Boyer's new study of Political Radicalism in Late
Imperial Vienna represents one of the first efforts to develop an interpretation of
late nineteenth-century Austrian politics informed by an acquaintance with the
concepts and assumptions of the current historiography of Bismarckian and
Wilhemine Germany.
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European point of view, one notes a wide range of assumptions,
issues, and motifs which are common to the historiography of north
German and German-Austrian liberalism, parallels which may
have been alluded to impressionistically but which have rarely
been studied in systematic fashion: the idea, for example, of
liberalism's "failure" in 1848- a genuine cliche which few bother
to question; the chronic condition of Vereinsmeierei, or
"clubishness," which hindered the development of party discipline;
the notion that liberals squandered their energies in obsessive
campaigns against the Catholic Church in the 1860sand 1870s;the
idea that later challenges to liberalism by Christian Socialism and
social democracy led to the development of a defensive "seige
mentality" and a "hardening of attitudes" among liberals. All of
these

thematic

parallels

-

and others,

as well

-

deserve

systematic, comparative investigation. The differences brought to
light by this kind of scrutiny will naturally be just as instructive as
the similarities.
Also within the comparative context, it would be wise to pay
more attention to the native eighteenth and early nineteenthcentury sources of central European liberalism. In Austria's case,
there is already a swelling literature on Joseph II and the
"Josephinian" tradition which amply illustrates the ambiguous
relationship between enlightened Hofratsliberalismus on the one
hand - with its ideal of the well-tempered bureaucratic
Rechtsstaat - and liberal individualism and mistrust of the state on
the other. But this emphasis on Josephinism, important as it is, has
encouraged neglect of the relationships between Weimar
classicism, north German philosophy, and liberalism in Austria.
Despite the strength of Josephinism, and despite all the efforts of
the Church and the Habsburg restoration to quarantine the
monarchy from northern influences, north German ideas were
widely known, discussed, and assimilated by the Austro-German
intelligentsia and administrative elite in the Vormdrz.'8The public
and private discourse of German-Austria - its correspondence,
diaries, imaginative literature, historiography, political rhetoric,
etc., - testifies to the fact that Austrian intellectuals and liberal
politicians worked in essentially the same metaphorical framework
and with the same eighteenth-century themes as their north
German counterparts - Bildung, maturation, spiritual freedom,
etc. The methods of comparative literary criticism and the social
18. David S. Luft, Robert Musil and the Crisis of European Culture, 1800-1942
(Berkeley, 1980), p. 7.
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history of ideas could be profitably applied to the further
exploration of these relationships.
A special problem in this regard is presented by the
conventional notion that the Aufkldrung's introspective approach
to freedom - the cult of Bildung associated with the Weimar circle
and Kant - actually constituted a key obstacle to the growth of an
activist, democratic-liberalism in German Europe and provided a
convenient smoke-screen for the elitism of Bildung und Besitz.19
There is much truth in this, and it is not difficult to find Austrian
cases which fit the pattern; Stifter's famous novel Der
Nachsommer, for example, has often been read as an archetypical
case of the approach to freedom as a passive escape or refuge, rather
than an activist answer to pressing political and social problems.
Yet one should be wary of dismissing the Bildung tradition out of
hand, as automatically conducive to political timidity, quietism, or
ivory tower withdrawal; the eighteenth-century German approach
to liberty may not have been quite as inherently inimical to
democratic activism as it is normally made out to be. Classical
Marxism, for example - in its ideas of class consciousness and
proletarian revolution - builds directly on the Bildung tradition of
freedom; the same can be said of revisionist socialism. Moreover,
most central European democrats - from those of 1848 down to
Dahrendorf - have drawn powerful inspiration from the
eighteenth-century tradition. Finally, we should not dismiss outof-hand the importance of the "self-help" approaches associated
with early reform liberalism in the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s, which
were inspired in central Europe largely by the idea of Bildung. It
should not be forgotten that the "self-help" approach - based on
the idea of the assimilation of laboring groups to the existing social
and economic system - conformed to the actual historical
experience of most liberal leaders. The pattern had always been for
the talented and ambitious to assimilate to the German elite, and
this understandably shaped the expectations of early reformers.20
At the turn of the century, revisionist socialism and reform
liberalism - both largely inspired by the eighteenth-century
tradition - showed faint but encouraging signs of merging into a
democratic, progressive activism.
Finally, a comparative approach would highlight important
rhetorical and conceptual problems related to the historiography of
central European liberalism. The entire issue of the terminology
19. See, e.g., Sheehan, German Liberalism, pp. 18, 104.
20. On the wisdom of an old-fashioned "historist" perspective
see Nipperdey, "Wehler's Kaiserreich'," p. 545.
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used to interpret liberalism, for example, could profit from more
conscious reflection. The terms and metaphors which control
present-day discourse about nineteenth-century liberalism are, to
a great extent, taken over directly from the figurative language of
pathology invented in some cases, and broadcast by insecure or
disillusioned turn-of-the-century liberals themselves (as well as by
renegade progressives whose original liberalism had curdled and
gone sour). Aside from the very limited use of more sophisticated
statistical and quantitative methods, contemporary students of
liberalism have not gone much beyond the left-liberal vocabulary
of scholarship and journalism associated with such figures as Max
Weber and Friedrich Naumann in Germany, Heinrich Friedjung,
Richard Charmatz, and Friedrich Hertz in Austria - men who
disseminated a language of analysis for the pre-1914 generation.
The key images and phrases used to explain liberalism today - e. g.,
"paralysis," "decline," "myopia," "bankruptcy," and perhaps the
most threadbare of the lot, "crisis" - are basically the ones
introduced before the Great War.21Obviously, historians cannot
ignore the imagery and texture of the language used by people they
study; in the case of liberalism (traditionally associated with selfexamination and toleration of heretical viewpoints), turn-of-thecentury liberals were themselves among their own best critics.
Still, whatever advantages the historian enjoys over the subjects of
his study he owes largely to refinements of vocabulary, diction, and
syntax made possible by hindsight. The fact is that historians of
central Europe have been unimaginative in searching for a fresh
linguistic framework of analysis to explain nineteenth-century
liberalism, and often have not been very thoughtful in using the
language they have inherited.
Closely associated with the problem of terminology is the
question of periodization. I have already alluded to the obvious but
nonetheless frequently ignored pitfalls of mechanically dividing
"periods" into "early," "high," and "late" phases of development, a
practice inspired by the analogy of the life cycle with its stages of
"growth" and "decadence." Despite the current fashion of
emphasizing "continuity" in central European studies, for
explanatory purposes most historians continue to rely heavily on
the practice of packing time into descrete "eras" or "epochs." There
is genuine irony in the fact that historians of Austria - in stark
21. These are all taken from Sheehan's German Liberalism, pp. 118,273,154,
283, 140. Compare the imagery, for example, of Charmatz's "Die
Deutschfortschrittlichen," Der Weg (Vienna), 7 October, 1905.
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contrast to the slight long-range importance they generally
attribute to liberalism - often refer to the 1860sand 1870s,or even
to the entire period between 1867and 1918,as die liberale Ara or das
liberale Zeitalter.22 This well-worn convention is a legacy of
Friedjung's generation. In Austrian history, the financial crash of
1873 is typically depicted as a symbolic event which sounded the
death knell of the "liberal era." Unquestionably, liberalism as a
political creed lost much of its elan after the 1870s.Nevertheless, the
practice of conceptualizing events in terms of self-contained
"epochs" is fraught with danger, especially insofar as it can serve as
a way to quietly suggest that past approaches to problems are
"transcended" by "history" and lose all relevance for the future.
In the space remaining I wish to draw attention to three
important but neglected areas of study: biography, the relationship
of political and intellectual history to economic history, and the
subject of progressive (or "neo") liberalism.
Perhaps most striking of all in this connection is the slight
attention paid to biographical research on Austrian liberals, either
as individuals or as a group. Broad generalizations about
"liberalism" and the group psychology and behavior of "the
liberals"abound, but we really know remarkably little in detail
about individual liberals - their life histories, personalities, and
unique sensibilities. Even in Austria it is difficult to find recent
biographical studies. In some instances this situation may be
attributed to a lack of documentation, but in many cases it simply
reflects the fact that archives and libraries have not been combed
with a view to liberal biography.
In the late 1970s, for example, the Austrian National Library's
subject catalog for the period since 1931listed one article reprint on
the federalist Adolf Fischhof, one dissertation each on the editor
Moritz Benedikt, the parliamentary leader Eduard Herbst, and the
historian Richard Charmatz, one article reprint on Joseph Redlich,
and nothing at all on Ernst von Plener. The case of so well-known a
figure as Anton von Schmerling is especially interesting.
Schmerling's Nachlass has been housed in the Austrian state
archives since the late 1930s,yet so far as I can determine it has been
the basis for only one 59-page biographical essay by Paul Molisch23
22. E.g., Erich Zollner, Geschichte Osterreichs von den Anfingen bis zur
Gegenwart, 4th ed. (Vienna, 1970),p. 413;Fuchs, Geistige Stromungen, p.5. On the
origins of this convention, see Walther, "Exkurs: Wirtschaftlicher Liberalismus,"
pp.808-809.
23. Paul Molisch, Anton von Schmerling und der Liberalismus in Osterreich
(Brunn, 1944).
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and four dissertations on special aspects of Schmerling's career despite the fact that it contains Schmerling's correspondence with
his mother during 1848and a lengthy draft of an autobiography in
Schmerling's own hand.
Various reasons could be cited to explain the neglect of liberal
biography. First, under the influence of social science methodology
(and often with good reason) the research interests of historians in
general have shifted way from biography narrowly conceived as
"life history." Moreover, the liberal movement - despite the fact
that it was led by intensely individualistic Honoratioren produced no magnetic leaders who captured the popular or
scholarly imagination. One author has aptly observed that, aside
from some impressive tombstones and two statues honoring Mayor
Andreas Zelinka and the geologist Eduard Suess, there are no
public monuments dedicated to liberals in Vienna.24 It is true that
many of the liberal leaders - e.g., Schmerling, Herbst, the younger
Plener - strike one as cold, stiff, tactless, and unimaginative.
Furthermore, after the eruption of popular anti-Semitism in the
1880s,liberalism was increasingly identified as a "Jewish" ideology.
This was of enormous significance, not only for the fortunes of
liberalism as a political movement (culminating in the miserable
showing of the "Biirgerlich-Demokratische Partei" in 1919),but for
historiography of liberalism as well.
The problem can be resolved only through archival research.
This work can be approached in various ways, and I will only make
two suggestions in this regard. First, historians should try to
investigate more closely not only the lives and careers of the
liberals of Vienna, but those of other regions and cities as well: Linz,
Graz, Brtinn, Prague, etc. In the provincial cities, liberals
frequently exercised political power longer than in the imperial
capital, sometimes right to the end of the Habsburg period; more
attention to the local history of liberalism would enrich and
counterbalance the traditional, one-sided focus on Austro-German
liberalism as an essentially Viennese phenomenon.25
Secondly, Namierite and sociological approaches which aim at
24. Vocelka, Verfassung oder Konkordat?, p. 134.

25. A scattering of relevant local studies does exist: William H. Hubbard,
"Politics and Society in the Central European City: Graz, Austria, 1861-1918,"
Canadian Journal of History, 5 (March 1970): 25-45; Kurt Wimmer, Liberalismus in

Ober6sterreich (Linz, 1979);Kurt Tweraser, "Der Linzer Gemeinderat 1880-1914:
Glanz und Elend birgerlicher

Herrschaft," Historisches

Jahrbuch der Stadt Linz

(1979):293-341;and, most recently, Gary B. Cohen, The Politics of Ethnic Survival:
Germans in Prague, 1861-1914 (Princeton,

N.J., 1981).
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the collective political or social biography of liberals (though these
would, in themselves, be exceedingly valuable) are unlikely to yield
results which would cause us to question conventional
generalizations, or go beyond the tedious ideological "unmasking"
and tendentious linking of liberalism with "bourgeois culture"
which is already so common. It is a fact that, politically, the mid and
late-nineteenth century liberals fell dramatically from grace and
that, socially, their mainstream views were overwhelmed by new,
more populist and democratic attitudes. Few would disagree that
"By the turn of the century, liberalism had been pushed to the
fringes of the political scene, seriously weakened by its own
divisions and ambiguities," although whether one can speak of its
"apparently irreversible alienation from the most active forces in
German life"26 is less clear. A broader appreciation of the
significance of liberalism in nineteenth-century life requires an
understanding of its individual nuances and anomalies, and this
suggests that the current methodological orthodoxy of political
sociology, with its emphasis on the "class" character of liberal
"ideology," should be complemented whenever possible by other
methods, such as those of traditional intellectual history combined
with newer techniques of rhetorical and stylistic criticism.
Austrian archives and libraries are rich in unexploited collections
of correspondence, unpublished memoirs, diaries, etc. A close
reading of these private texts (along, of course, with published
works), one concerned with the private and public rhetoric of
liberalism - its texture, surface imagery, and metaphorical
structure - offers a promising method for constructing the mental
biography of liberalism, fixing the place of the liberal sensibility
and imagination in late Habsburg history, and for helping to
determine its meaning for future generations as well.
A different but potentially equally rewarding field of inquiry
concerns the question of relationships between Austrian economic
growth, economic theory, and liberalism. Until quite recently, the
entire field of modern Austro-Hungarian economic history was
itself virtually "dormant."27Traditionally, scholarly interest was
trained on the more dramatic cases of industrialization or economic
backwardness - Britain, America, and Bismarckian Germany on
the one hand, tsarist Russia on the other - and historians of the
26. James J. Sheehan, "Liberalism and the City in Nineteenth-Century
Germany," Past and Present, 51 (May 1971):116.
27. N.T. Gross, The Industrial Revolution in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1750-1914
(London, 1972), p. 12 (reprinted from Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic
History of Europe, vol. 4: pp. 228-278).
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Austrian economy were largely content to adapt their data to
general theoretical frameworks, particularly the widely held
notion of a "great depression" in Europe between 1873and 1896.28
The key event in this cataclysmic configuration of events is the
Vienna stock market crash of 1873.In Austrian historiography, the
great Krach carries a heavy load of symbolism; almost universally,
it is represented as having shaken "middle-class society" - and its
liberal political leadership - to the roots, and it is conventionally
used as a device to signify the onset of liberalism's demise.
The practice of unreflectively invoking the "great depression"
thesis as a ready-made device for explaining liberalism's "decline"
has become so commonplace as to arouse a certain measure of
skepticism. What if there were no "great depression?" In the case of
Britain, it has in fact been argued that the idea is a myth,29 and
Alexander Gerschenkron has called the idea "dubious" for
Germany as well.30 Recently, an alternative school of thought in
Austrian economic history - "analytical" as opposed to
"descriptive" - has arisen. The approach rests on often
controversial quantitative methods and its adherents warn that
their findings are tentative.31 Nevertheless, they have seriously
challenged the notion that nineteenth-century Habsburg economic
development was essentially characterized by dramatic booms and
busts, and some have specifically questioned the idea of a "great
depression" in Austria. One scholar states flatly: "Austria does not
seem to have suffered a long depression in the 23 years after the
crash of 1873.... in terms of the behavior of real output, the 'great
depression' in Austria, as in England, is essentially a myth."32
What are the implications of this position for our understanding
28. For central Europe, Hans Rosenberg has been the most important
popularizer of the "great depression" thesis: see note 13.
29. S.B. Saul, The Myth of the Great Depression, 1873-1896(London, 1969).
30. "The Great Depression in Germany," in Alexander Gerschenkron,
Continuity in History and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 406
31. For a bibliography of the recent work, as well as some of the more important
older studies, see Richard L. Rudolph, Banking and Industrialization in AustriaHungary: The Role of Banks in the Industrialization of the Czech Crownlands, 18731914 (Cambridge, 1976),p. 233, n. 3. Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften,
Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918,1: Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung (Vienna,
1973)presents both traditional and more recent points of view.
32. David F. Good, "Stagnation and 'Take-Off' in Austria, 1873-1913,"The
Economic History Review, second series, 27 (1974):83. See also chapters one (on
Germany) and five (on Austria-Hungary) of Alan S. Milward and S.B. Saul, The
Development of the Economies of Continental Europe, 1850-1914(Cambridge, Mass.,
1977);also Nipperdey, "Wehler's 'Kaiserreich'," p. 556, who notes a tendency for the
"great depression" thesis to become a fast allerkliirenden Mythos.
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of Austrian liberalism and, indeed, for our general attitudes toward
late nineteenth-century Austrian political history as a whole? This
is a complex problem which requires careful research and
reflection. Even if the econometric thesis proves ultimately
convincing, we cannot overlook the fact that market fluctuations,
financial scandals, etc., were widely perceived in a traumatic way,
and that this perception contributed to disillusionment with
liberalism and a climate of cynicism or indifference toward rational
politics in general; the testimony of the contemporary press,
periodicals, pamphlet literature, and private papers is simply
undeniable on this score. On the other hand, it may be that one of
the reasons for the popularity of the "great depression" theory is
that it has served so well the students of "cultural despair" and antiSemitism who are really interested in the roots of National
Socialism, and not primarily in the late nineteenth century itself.
Moreover, in recent years the influence of Marxian theory has been
so pervasive that even the most superficial accounts of the "decline
and fall" of the old order in central Europe have at least had to bow
melodramatically in the direction of economic "crisis." It may
prove that this has led to an exaggerated emphasis on the weakness
of liberalism as an idea, if not as a political movement, in the late
nineteenth century.
One suspects that the "great depression" paradigm is to some
extent a backward projection of the personal experience of its
disseminators during the "great depression" of the 1930s,which is
also regularly explained as a "crisis" of liberalism. Coincidentally,
in both the 1870sand the 1930sthe onset of "crisis" was signaled by a
Viennese crash. Rosenberg, it should be noted, displays a
propensity for finding "great depressions" in the German past - as
far back as the early seventeenth century.33
Beyond this is an area of Austrian economic and intellectual
history which is especially noteworthy for the lack of interest it has
aroused among historians: the "Austrian School" of economic
theory associated with Carl Menger, Friedrich von Wieser, and
Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, and its specific relationship to the late
nineteenth-century context. Though its doctrines were influential
and widely debated in the first three decades of this century,
careful study of this school - with its emphasis on the heroic role of
the individual entrepreneur - has had very low marginal utility
for the majority of scholars since the 1930s.Friedrich von Hayek's
33. See Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy:
Prussian Experience, 1660-1815 (1958; reprint ed., Boston, 1966), pp. 33, 59.

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Wed, 29 Oct 2014 13:40:42 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

The

244

GERMAN STUDIES REVIEW

roots in this tradition are, of course, acknowledged, and there is a
cult of "free enterprisers" and libertarians in the United States who
are enthusiasts for the doctrines of Menger, Bohm-Bawerk, and
especially Ludwig von Mises. Even they, however, have not done
much to shed light on the historical origins and significance of the
doctrine - partly because the father of the school, Menger himself,
disdained "historicism," partly due to their own lack of interest in
historical explanation. In Austria itself, the current cimate of neoliberal/social democratic opinion has not been conducive to
historical interest in Menger's ideas.34
Here, indeed, is a virtual historiographical vacuum. How,
specifically, are the school's idea of marginal utility, its deductive,
Aristotelian method, its opposition to "historicism," its theory of
the business cycle, and its generally subjectivist approach to life
related to the broader Austrian scene? Once again, basic
intellectual biography would seem to be a logical first step. A
concerted attempt should be made to relate the lives and ideas of
the Austrian masters, and their lesser disciples such as
Philoppovich, to the currents of late nineteenth-century political
and cultural life: "classical" liberalism, as well as progressive neoliberalism and revisionist social democracy; generational conflict;
the sense of undirected flux which preoccupied the Germanspeaking intelligentsia; upper-middle class aestheticism and status
envy for the aristocracy; status anxiety vis-a-vis the masses; the
intelligentsia's melancholy, adolescent obsession with the theme of
arrested growth; the fashionable rhetoric of decline and the
iconography of threatened masculinity which surfaced so often in
literature and the fine arts, and which permeates private records as
well.35
34. See the remarks of F.A. Hayek, "The Place of Menger's Grundsdtze in the
History of Economic Thought," in J.R. Hicks and W. Weber, eds., Carl Menger and
the Austrian School of Economics (Oxford, 1973),pp. 4-5. Also Murray N. Rothbard,
"New Light on the Prehistory of the Austrian School," in Edwin G. Dolan, ed., The
Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics (Kansas City, 1976), pp. 52-74;Emil
Kauder, A History of Marginal Utility Theory (Princeton, N.J., 1965) and
"Intellectual and Political Roots of the Older Austrian School," Zeitschrift fur
Nationalokonomie, 17 (December 1957): 411-425. For general bibliography, see
Hayek's article on the "Austrian School" in the International Encyclopedia of Social
Sciences and the references in Wiliam M. Johnston's The Austrian Mind (Berkeley,
1973)and R.S. Howey's The Rise of the Marginal Utility School, 1870-1889(Lawrence,
Kansas, 1960).
35. For some sketchy, impressionistic thoughts along these lines, see Erich
Streissler, "Structural Economic Thought: On The Significance of the Austrian
School Today," Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 29 (December 1969): 237-266,
especially pp. 256-260.

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Wed, 29 Oct 2014 13:40:42 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

245

Harry Ritter

Finally, I would like to draw attention to one last topic which
has been traditionally overlooked: progressivism, or "neoliberalism" (Neuliberalismus). In their rush to dispense with
liberalism and advance to the subjects of political extremism,
irrationalism, and expressionism, historians of central Europe have
tended to reduce turn-of-the-century liberalism to an autumnal
Geisteshaltung of melancholy Kulturliberalismus, or, at best, to
represent it as a derivative "post-liberal" echo of an allegedly alien
west European reformism. They seem to have been willing to agree
with Mussolini that liberalism was "no more than a parenthesis" in
central European history.36This point of view may have appeared
compelling in the 1930s and 1940s, when fascism and communism
seemed to many people to provide the chief political and economic
alternatives of the twentieth century. It should seem less
convincing today, however, at a time when revisionist liberalism is
the working philosophy of the west European and North American
welfare state, all intellectually chic references to the "bankruptcy"
of liberalism notwithstanding. Much of the confusion results from
the simple fact that all too often the authors of liberalism's obituary
are really talking about the "classical liberalism" of a generation of
liberals - usually that of the 1860s and 1870s - and not about the

evolving and continuing tradition of liberalism itself. Speaking of
the situation in Britain, where similar problems of interpretation
exist, one scholar has noted:
Modern liberalism has suffered mainly through sheer
ignorance of its nature. Even now, many of its modern
opponents assail with venom a set of principles that liberalism
itself discarded almost a century ago.... the underestimation of
liberalism appears to be the result of equating it with the
Liberal party, of an aversion to considering ideology outside
the aegis of party, and of a fixation with the mid-century
liberalism

of the utilitarians.

. . . condemning

liberalism

by

relating it to its earlier prototype was a crude method of antiliberal propaganda used by its opponents at the turn of the
century, but later transformed into a myth not refuted by
scholarship.37
36. Benito Mussolini, "The Doctrine of Fascism," in John Louis Beatty and
Oliver A. Johnson, eds., Heritage of Western Civilization, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., 1977),vol 2: p. 337.
37. Michael Freeden, The New Liberalism, pp. 1, 255. As for the association of
laissez-faire economics and liberalism, Freeden argues (p. 23) that this was
"transient." Freeden's discussion of the essential and ephemeral elements of the
British liberal tradition on pp. 22-23 might well be extended to the western liberal
tradition as a whole.
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At present, it seems reasonable to entertain the idea that pre1914revisionist liberalism in Austria - like progressive liberalism
elsewhere - represents a prelude rather than a climax, a glimmer
of the neo-liberal/social democratic future rather than a quixotic
effort to resuscitate the corpse of a dead ideology. At the very least,
deserves to be rescued from posterity's
progressivism
condescension and recognized as an important undercurrent
in the intellectual and political history of Austria on the eve of
World War I.38

This viewpoint is, in fact, beginning to win modest support.
Such recent books as Ingrid Belke's study of Josef Popper,39and
especially Eva Holleis' brief survey of Viennese Fabianism and the
Sozialpolitsche Partei,40 highlight turn-of-the-century efforts to
revise liberal doctrine to meet the demands of industrial society
and democratic politics, and suggest that neo-liberal projects may
have been something more than "poignant examples of hope's
triumph over experience" in central Europe.41
Actually, one suspects that Austrian liberalism - even in its
"classical" and "national liberal" guises - was never quite so rigid
or socially obtuse as it is regularly made out to have been. Karl
Giskra's infamous remark about the social question stopping "at
Bodenbach" was perhaps more exceptional in its callousness than
genuinely representative of liberal opinion. Heinrich Friedjung,
the famous historian, is a good example of a liberal who is seldom
associated with enlightened social views. In point of fact, Friedjung
was a perceptive sociocultural historian, as the second volume of his
unfinished Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860 testifies. He began his
political career as a populist and, as editor of the Deutsche
38. One of the few American studies to address the subject in Austria, even in
passing, is John W. Boyer, "Freud, Marriage, and Late Viennese Liberalism: A
Commentary from 1905,"The Journal of Modern History, 50 (March 1978):72-102,
especially pp. 73-91. It, too, views progressivism in terms of "post-liberal bourgeois
culture" (p.77). Boyer's reference to "the destruction of [Vienna's] German Liberal
tradition" by 1895 (Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna, p. ix), is only
justified in party political terms.
39. Ingrid Belke, Die sozialreformischen Ideen von Josef Popper-Lynkeus
(1838-1921)in Zusammenhang mit allgemeinen Reformbestrebungen des Wiener
Biurgertums um die Jahrhundertwende (Tiibingen, 1979).
40. Eva Holleis, Die Sozialpolitische Partei: Sozialliberale Bestrebungen in
Wien um die Jahhundertwende (Munich, 1978).
41. Sheehan, German Liberalism, p. 258. American critics have not thus far
been impressed by the possible merits of this approach. See the unenthusiastic
review of Holleis by William H. Hubbard, The American Historical Review, 85
(December 1979):1421-1422.
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Wochenschrift in the 1880s,he consistently devoted a large amount
of space to social issues. As a liberal city councilor in Vienna in the
early 1890s, he defended social reform, and was a member of the
Viennese Fabian Society.
Other examples could be cited, such as the efforts of Richard
Charmatz and the circle around the short-lived periodical Der Weg
to encourage industrialization and foster a "neo-liberal" political
alliance of progressives and revisionist social democrats.42 Such
efforts, it is true, enjoyed at best modest political success; in
quantitative terms - the hard facts and figures and calculated
"results" at the political ledger's "bottom line" - their practical
achievements before 1914do not amount to a great deal. In terms of
the history of ideas and human sentiment, however, they are not
unimportant. Moreover, Holleis has correctly assessed their longterm political significance for the twentieth century:
In the more distant future, the ideas and methods of the
Sozialpolitiker proved themselves - at least in the western
world - politically more effective than the Marxist, Christian,
or nationalist ideologies. The fact is often overlooked that the
social welfare state established in the west after 1945rests on
the theory and practice of liberal economists who have worked

since the 1870s....

Whoever looks for the roots of the Austrian welfare state
will inevitably encounter the social-political movement at the
end of the nineteenth century. The ideas of the Sozialpolitiker,
their notions of a liberal welfare state, have been realized today
in almost all the states of the western world.43
In conclusion, there may indeed be genuinely sound reasons
for contriving the history of late nineteenth-century Austrian
liberalism in ironic terms: the existence of a tension, for example,
between the oft-encountered liberal emphasis on "manliness" as
an expression of independence and self-reliance, and many
individual liberals' characteristic self-pity and debilitating sense of
inferiority in the face of an ideal of baroque aristocratic grace which
the liberal imagination itself had done much to invent. The notion
of the "death" of liberalism at the turn-of-the-century, however, is
42. Charmatz, Deutsch-Osterreichische Politik, pp. 7-9, 239,305-306,308,324.A
broad range of other examples can be found in Belke, Die sozialreformischen Ideen.
43. Holleis, Die Sozialpolitische Partei, pp. 107, 112. Freeden's remarks
concerning Britain in The New Liberalism, p. 1,are similar in tone. For Germany, cf.
Zmarzlik, "Das Kaiserreich in neuer Sicht?" pp. 69-70;also Nipperdey, "Wehler's
'Kaiserreich'," pp. 543-545,554-555.
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not one of them. In this respect, it perhaps is often not so much the
liberals themselves as some of their historians who should be
viewed ironically. If, after having reconsidered the subject of late
nineteenth-century Austrian liberalism, it proves impossible to
imagine its history in the reconciliatory terms of high comedy, it
may at least be possible to avoid the teleological cliches of specious
"tragedy," the pathos of middlebrow journalism, and the conceit of
glib irony.
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